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REPORTS OF CASES
DETERMINED IN

rrH:E SUPREME COURrT
OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
[42 C.2d 1; 264 P.2d 9211

[S. F. No. 18871.

In Bank.

Dec. 31, 1953.]

HENRY K. HENDERSON, Respondent, v. LILY ZELLERBACH DRAKE, Appellant.
[1] Attachment-Proceedings in Principal Action-Effect of Judgment for Defendant: Stay Pending AppeaL-Under Code Civ.
Proc., §§ 553, 946, relating to discharge of attachment after
judgment for defendant and to effect of appeal, an attachment
may be preserved by taking an appeal and an attachment remains effective after rendition of judgment for defendant until
there is no longer a right to appeal, unless written notice of
entry of judgment is given in which event the appeal must
be perfected within five days after such notice or attachment
becomes subject to discharge.
[2] !d.-Proceedings in Principal Action-Effect of Judgment for
Defendant: Stay Pending Appeal.-Code Civ. Proc., § 553,
declaring that if defendant recovers judgment and no appeal
is taken and no undertaking filed the "order of attachment
[must] be discharged," necessarily implies that if an appeal is
perfected and an undertaking filed the attachment should not
be discharged.
[3] !d.-Proceedings in Principal Action-Stay Pending AppeaL-Code Civ. Proc., § 946, declaring that an appeal does not "con[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Attachment and Garnishment, §§ 104, 105;
Am.Jur., Attachment and Garnishment, § 956.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4, 8, 9] Attachment, §§53, 55; [3]
Attachment, §55; [5] Attachment, §124; [6] Judgments, §78;
[7] Waiver,§ 4.
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tinue in force an attachment, unless an undertaking·" is filed
and "unless within five days after written notice of the entry
of the ol'der appealed from," the appeal is perfected, necessarily implies that filing- of undertaking- and perfeetion of
appeal will keep attachment alive.
!d.-Proceedings in Principal Action-Effect of Judgment for
Defendant: Stay Pending AppeaL--An attachment is not
finally and irrevocably dissolved the moment a judgment for
defendant is entered; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 553, 946, when construed together, lead to conclusion that dissolvent force of
judgment is neutralized by a perfected appeal, provided the
additional undertaking is filed and appeal perfected within
specified time.
!d.-Discharge or Dissolution-Proceedings to Dissolve-Order
on Motion.-A motion to dissolve an attachment was properly
denied, although more than 60 days had elapsed since entry of
judgment for defendant without an appeal therefrom having
been taken by plaintiff, where, at time such motion was denied,
defendant could have appealed from order granting plaintiff's
motion for new trial and, had defendant done so, plaintiff
could have appealed from judg-ment (Rules on Appeal, rule
3(a)), filed an undertaking, and in that manner kept attachment alive.
Judgments- Entry- Notice.-A statutory requirement of
"written notice" of entry of judgment can be waived, and in
some circumstances the filing, by the party entitled to such
written notice, of a document disclosing his actual knowledge
of entry of judgment shows waiver of written notice.
Waiver-Knowledge and Intent.-Waiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a known right.
Attachment-Proceedings in Principal Action-Effect of Judgment for Defendant: Stay Pending Appeal.-l\fere fact that
plaintiff evidenced his actual knowledge of entry of adverse
judgment by moving for new trial does not show that he intended to waive his right to receive written notice thereof for
purpose of starting the running of five-day period within which
he could perfect an appeal and save his attachment. (Code
Civ. Proc., §§ 553, 946.)
!d.-Proceedings in Principal Action-Effect of Judgment for
Defendant-: Stay Pending AppeaL-Mere fact that defendant
incidentally indicated to plaintiff, by serving and filing notice
of motion to dissolve attachment, that judgment for defendant
had been entered is not sufficient compliance with statutory
requirement that written notice be given to start running of
five-day period within which plaintiff could perfect an appeal
and save his attachment. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 553, 946.)
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APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco denying motion to dissolve an attachment. William T. Sweigert, Judge. Affirmed.
Erskine, Erskine & Tulley and J. Oscar Goldstein for
Appellant.
H. W. Glensor for Respondent.
SCHAUER, J.-Defendant appeals from an order denying
her motion to dissolve an attachment. The only ground of
the motion was ''that judgment had been rendered in favor
of the defendant and no notice of appeal or undertaking
on appeal had been filed within five days from and after
the entry of said judgment." The sole question for decision
is the correctness of the order denying such motion. We have
concluded that under sections 553 and 946 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, upon which the motion was based, the trial
court was required to deny it.
In this action against defendant plaintiff attached certain
shares of corporate stock owned by defendant. Thereafter,
on November 26, 1951, judgment for defendant was entered
in that action. No formal written notice of entry of judgment
was given to plaintiff. No appeal was taken but on December
4, 1951, plaintiff served and filed notice of intention to move
for a new trial. On January 3, 1952, defendant served and
filed notice of motion to dissolve the attachment. On January 28, 1952, plaintiff's motion for a new trial was granted.
On February 6, 1952, defendant's motion to dissolve the
attachment was denied; on this date neither the time for an
appeal by defendant from the order granting the new trial
nor, in the event defendant took such appeal, for a crossappeal by plaintiff from the judgment, had expired.
Section 553 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides in
material part, "If the defendant recovers judgment against
the plaintiff, and no appeal is perfected and undertaking
executed and filed as provided in section 946 of this code,
. . . all the property attached . . . must be delivered to the
defendant or his agent, the order of attachment be discharged,
and the property released therefrom.'' Section 946 provides
in material part, ''An appeal does not continue in force an
attachment, unless an undertaking be executed and filed on
the part of the appellant . . . and unless, within five days
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after written notice of the entry of the order appealed from,
such appeal be perfected.''
[1] Under the wording of those sections it is clear that
an attachment may be preserved by taking an appeal and
that an attachment remains effective after rendition of judgment for defendant until there is no longer a right to appeal,
unless written notice of entry of judgment is given, in which
event the appeal must be perfected within five days after
such notice or the attachment becomes subject to discharge.
[2] Section 553 states that if defendant recovers judgment
and no appeal is taken and no undertaking filed, then the
"order of attachment [must] be discharged." This necessarily implies that if an appeal is perfected and an undertaking filed, then the attachment should not be discharged.
[3] Similarly, section 946 states that an appeal does not
"continue in force an attachment, unless an undertaking"
is filed and, "unless, within five days after written notice
of the entry of the order appealed from," the appeal is
perfected. 'l'his necessarily implies that the filing of the
undertaking and the perfection of the appeal will keep the
attachment alive. The only reference to time contained in
the sections is the requirement of section 946 that the appeal
be perfected "within five days after written notice of the
entry of the order appealed from." It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the attachment remains effective as
long as an appeal may be taken unless written notice of entry
of judgment is given, in which event the attachment perdures
for only five days after such notice unless an appeal is perfected within that time. If sections 553 and 946 were not
so construed, plaintiff would have to file his undertaking and
perfect his appeal at the same time the judgment for defendant was entered, or the mere entry of judgment for defendant
would discharge the attachment.
[4] As is held in Primm v. Superior Court (1906), 3 Cal.
App. 208, 211 [84 P. 786], an attachment is not "finally and
irrevocably dissolved the moment a judgment for defendant
is entered . . . . A fair, reasonable, unstrained construction
[of sections 553 and 946] leads to the conclusion that the
dissolvent force of a judgment is neutralized by a perfected
appeal, provided the additional undertaking is filed and the
appeal perfected within the specified time. This construction
gives harmonious effect to both sections and does not nullify
any part of either." (See, also, Morneault v. National Surety
Co. (1918), 37 Cal.App. 285, 286 [174 P. 81]; Clark v. Su-
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perior Court (1918), 37 Cal.App. 732, 734 [174 P. 681];
Albertsworth v. Glens Falls Indern. Co. (1948), 84 Cal.App.
2d 816, 819 [192 P.2d 66]; Davis v. Fidelity &; Deposit Co.
(1949), 93 Cal.App.2d 13, 16 [208 P.2d 414].)
[5] The time to appeal had not expired when the notice
of motion to dissolve the attachment was filed on January 3,
1952, or when the trial court denied such motion on February 6, 1952. Plaintiff had 60 days from the entry of
judgment (i. e., from November 26, 1951) in which to file
notice of appeal (Rules on Appeal, rule 2(a)), and when
he served and filed his notice of intention to move for a new
trial the time for appeal was extended (Rules on Appeal,
rule 3 (a) ) . When the trial court denied the motion to dissolve the attachment, plaintiff's motion for a new trial had
been granted. Regardless of the effect or lack of effect on
the attachment of the order granting a new trial, defendant
at the time of the denial of her motion to dissolve the attachment could have appealed from the order granting the new
trial and, had she clone so, plaintiff could have appealed from
the judgment (Rules on Appeal, rule 3 (a)). Therefore, on
February 6, 1952, there was still an opportunity for plaintiff
to perfect an appeal, file an undertaking, and in that manner
keep alive the attachment, and the trial court correctly
refused to order that the attachment be dissolved.
Since no written notice of entry of the judgment of November 26, 1951, was given, the five days referred to in section
946 did not run. Defendant urges that although she did not
give formal notice of entry of judgment and thus start the
running of the five-day period, there was substantial compliance with the requirement of section 946 that ''written
notice'' be given. She says that her notice of motion to
dissolve the attachment was, in effect, a notice of entry of
judgment, and that plaintiff's notice of motion for a new
trial constituted a waiver of written notice of entry of judgment. [6] It is true that a statutory requirement of "written notice" of entry of judgment can be waived, and that in
some circumstances it has been held that the filing, by the
party entitled to such written notice, of a document disclosing his actual knowledge of the entry of judgment shows
waiver of the written notice. (Prothero v. Superior Cottrt
(1925), 196 Cal. 439, 441, 444 [238 P. 357].) [7] But
waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.
(Roesch v. De Mota (1944), 24 Cal.2cl 563, 572 [150 P.2d
422] .) [8] The fact that plaintiff here evidenced his actual
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knowledge of the entry of judgment does not show that he
intended to waive his right to receive written notice thereof
for the purpose of starting the running of the five-day period
within which he could save his attachment. (See Hughes
Mfg. etc. Co. v. Elliott (1914), 167 Cal. 494, 496 [140 P. 17] .)
[9] And the fact that defendant incidentally indicated to
plaintiff, by serving and filing her notice of motion to dissolve
the attachment, that judgment had been entered is not sufficient compliance with the statutory requirement that written
notice be given to start the running of the five-day period.
(See Byrne v. Hudson (1899), 127 Cal. 254,257 [59 P. 597].)
For the reasons above stated the order appealed from is
affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
By a skillful process of legal legerdemain the majority
opinion attempts to bring to life an attachment which died
a natural death on January 28, 1952, when plaintiff's motion
for a new trial was granted by the trial court.
It is conceded by the majority that pursuant to sections
553 and 946 of the Code of Civil Procedure an attachment
is dissolved when judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant unless he perfects an appeal and gives an undertaking within five days after receiving notice of entry of
judgment, and that it is not kept alive by proceedings on
motion for a new trial.
In the light of this concession let us examine the record:
(1) November 26, 1951. Judgment for defendant entered.
(2) December 4, 1951. Plaintiff served and filed notice of
intention to move for a new trial on all statutory grounds.
(3) January 3, 1952. Defendant served and filed notice to
dissolve attachment.
( 4) January 28, 1952. Motion for new trial granted.
( 5) February 6, 1952. Motion to dissolve attachment
denied.
(6) The agreed statement on appeal states: "No appeal
has ever been taken by [defendant] Henry K. Henderson
from said judgment. No undertaking on appeal was filed by
Henry K. Henderson within five days after the entry of said
judgment or at any other time.''
It is true that no formal notice of entry of judgment was
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given by defendant, but both plaintiff's notice of intention
to move for a new trial and defendant's notice of motion
to dissolve the attachment refer to "the judgment heretofore
made and entered in the above entitled action." It seems
to me that it is stretching legalism to the breaking point to
say, in view of this record, that plaintiff did not have adequate
notice of entry of judgment. But conceding that he did not,
and that his time to perfect an appeal from the judgment
and give an undertaking did not expire until five days after
such notice was given, or his time for appeal had expired,
or had lost his right to appeal, there can be no question that
the latter event occurred on January 28th, 1952, when his
motion for a new trial was granted. This event terminated
his right to appeal, as it is well settled that an appeal does
not lie from an unconditional order or judgment in favor
of the appellant and such an appeal must be dismissed (3 Cal.
Jur.2d § 110, p. 566). The fact that plaintiff could have
cross-appealed from the judgment if defendant had appealed
from the order granting the new trial, is beside the question,
as defendant did not appeal and the order granting plaintiff's
motion for a new trial has become final. There can be no
question that plaintiff's right to appeal from the judgment
was lost when his motion for a new trial was granted. Conceding that plaintiff would have had a right to cross-appeal
from the judgment if defendant had appealed from the order
granting the new trial, since defendant did not appeal from
said order, plaintiff's right to cross-appeal never came into
existence.
rrhe order denying defendant's motion to dissolve the attachment was entered February 6, 1952, nine days after the
motion for a new trial was granted. At that time plaintiff
had not and could not comply with the requirements of sections 553 and 946 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the
motion to dissolve the attachment should, therefore, have been
granted.
Even accepting the unsound reasoning of the majority, that
at the time defendant's motion to dissolve the attachment
was denied, plaintiff's time to appeal had not expired, because
he had the right to cross-appeal if defendant appealed from
the order granting the new trial, and, therefore, the motion
was properly denied, it will avail plaintiff nothing, as the
attachment must now be dissolved because of plaintiff's noncompliance with the provisions of sections 553 and 946 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
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The last cited code sections and decisions construing them
make it clear that the pendency of a motion for a new trial
or the granting of that motion does not operate to stay the
extinguishment of an attachment, or that an attachment continues in force until the motion is determined. While the
Legislature saw fit to provide for keeping the attachment
alive in event of an appeal by plaintiff, and there appears
to be no reason why they· did not make a similar provision
in case of a pending motion for a new trial, the fact remains
that section 553, supra, requires without limitation (except
in the case of appeal) that when defendant recovers judgment
the attachment must be discharged. Nothing is said about a
motion for new trial and I know of no other statute which
makes the pendency of such a motion operate to keep the
attachment alive. There is no provision for giving an undertaking to keep the attachment in force when a motion for a
new trial is made as there is when an appeal is taken. The
undertaking in the case of an appeal is to give protection
to the defendant in addition to that afforded by the undertaking to obtain the attachment. (Albertsworth v. Glens Falls
Inclern. Co., 84 Cal.App.2d 816 [192 P.2d 66].) The absence
of a provision for such added protection pending the disposition of a motion for a new trial indicates that the pendency
of such a motion does not keep the attachment alive. It has
been held that a motion for a new trial does not in itself
stay the execution of the judgment by the prevailing party.
(People v. Loucks, 28 Cal. 68; Jones v. Spears, 56 Cal. 163;
Harris v. Barnhart, 97 Cal. 546 [32 P. 589]; Kolcole v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.App. 454 [120 P. 67]; Knowles v.
Thompson, 133 Cal. 245, 247 [65 P. 468] ; 121 A.L.R. 686.)
Before it was amended in 1907 and 1909 (Stats. 1907, p. 708;
1909, p. 967), section 553 did not contain the provision for
keeping the attachment alive by perfecting an appeal, and it
was held that an appeal by plaintiff from the judgment and
a reversal thereof did not stay the discharge of the attachment or revive it. (Loveland v. Alvord Consol. Quartz Min.
Co., 76 Cal. 562 [18 P. 682] ; Hamilton v. Bell, 123 Cal. 93
[55 P. 758]; contra: cases collected 115 A.L.R. 598.) And
under the prior law the lack of finality of the judgment
with regard to appeal did not prevent the discharge of the
attachment. (Aigeltinger v. Whelan, 133 Cal. 110 [65 P.
125] .) Indeed, since the amendment to 553, the making in
the trial court and granting of a motion to vacate a judgment
for defendant does not preserve the attachment (Clark v.
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Superior Court, 37 Cal.App. 732 [174 P. 681}). Under a
statute similar to ours the same result has been reached in
regard to a pending motion for a new trial (Ranft v. Young,
21 Nev. 401 [32 P. 490] ). It is clear, therefore, that the
Legislature has not made either the pendency or granting
of a motion for a new trial after judgment for defendant
effective to keep alive or revive an attachment.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the majority affirms an
order which is obviously invalid and which must be vacated
by the trial court when this decision becomes final. This,
however, will necessitate further proceedings in the trial
court and another appeal if the losing party sees fit to thus
prolong the litigation.
This is unfortunate in view of the overcrowded condition
of our court calendars. It also violates the policy of our
courts to decide cases so as to terminate litigation wherever
possible in the interests of justice.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the order.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
It is my opinion that plaintiff had written notice of the
entry of judgment within the meaning of section 946 of the
Code of Civil Procedure and that his right to preserve the
attachment by taking an appeal was therefore lost five days
after the service of the notice.
Judgment :for defendant was entered on November 26, 1951.
On December 4, 1951, plaintiff served and filed notice of
intention to move for a new trial, and on January 3, 1952,
defendant served and filed notice of motion to vacate the
attachment on the ground that ''judgment had been rendered
in favor of the defendant and no notice of appeal or undertaking on appeal had been filed within five days from and
after the entry of said judgment.'' At no time thereafter
did plaintiff perfect an appeal from the judgment. Defendant's motion was denied on February 6, 1952, after plaintiff's
motion :for a new trial had been granted. Section 946 of the
Code o:f Civil Procedure provides that an attachment may
be continued in force if an appeal is perfected "within five
days after written notice o:f the entry of the' order appealed
from." "\Vhether or not plaintiff's notice of motion for a
new trial constituted a waiver of the right to written notice
(see Prothero v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. 439, 444 [238 P.
357], defendant's notice of motion to vacate the attachment,
which recited that ''judgment had been rendered in favor
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of defendant,'' constituted written notice of the entry of the
judgment within the meaning of seetion 946. The right to
preserve the attachment by taking an appeal was therefore
lost five days after the service of the notice on January 3, 1952.
Section 946 assures the plaintiff knowledge of the entry
of judgment and fixes the date for the eommeneement of
the running of the five-day period. These purposes were
aceomplished when defendant served and filed her notice of
motion to vacate the attachment. The only other possible
purpose for the notiee of the entry of judgment is to bring
home to the plaintiff that the defendant is asserting his right
to have the attaehment dissolved if an appeal is not perfected
in five days. (See Byrne v. Htldson, 127 Cal. 254, 257 [59
P. 597] .) Since defendant's notice expressly called plaintiff's attention to the fact that defendant was relying on
the entry of judgment to establish her right to dissolution of
the attaehment, it could not have subserved this purpose better.
The majority opinion states, however, that "the fact that
defendant incidentally indieated to plaintiff, by serving and
filing her notice of motion to dissolve the attachment, that
judgment had been entered is not sufficient eompliance with
the statutory requirement that written notiee be given to
start the nmning of the five-day period. (See Byrne v.
Hudson (1899), 127 Cal. 254,257 [59 P. 597].)" In the
Byrne case the judgment provided that if plaintiff did not
pay defendant a certain sum of money within 20 days of
written notice of entry of judgment she would lose her equity
of redemption. Defendant served on plaintiff a notice of
intention to move for a new trial, reciting that the judgment
had been entered. 'l'he court held that this notice of motion
was not sufiicient to start the running of the 20-day period.
'' 'rhe question arose out of the express terms of the judgment,
which required 'written notice of the entry of this judgment.'
We think, therefore, that as appellant's rig·ht in the premises
depended upon the commencement of the running of a certain period of time mentioned in the judgment, and as her
title was to be forfeited unless a certain act was done within
that period of time, she was entitled to a notice expressly
intended for the purpose of starting the period of time
mentioned in the judgment, and that a mere incidental recital
in a notice of a motion for a new trial, given for an entirely
different purpose, was not a sufficient compliance with the
terms of the judgment." (127 Cal. at 257.) In the present
case, however, defendant's notice of motion was not given
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for a purpose foreign to the attachment, but was related
directly to the effect of the entry of judgment on its continuance. The fact that judgment had been entered was not
recited merely incidentally, but as the very basis for the
intended motion. Defendant may have been premature in
noticing her motion to dissolve the attachment, but by doing
so she gave plaintiff all the notice of the entry of judgment
to which he was entitled. When he failed within five days to
perfect an appeal from the judgment, defendant was entitled
to have the attachment dissolved.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January
27, 1954. Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.

[L. A. No. 22341.
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CHARLES BEYJ1JRBACH, Appellant, v. JUNO OIL COMpANY (a Corporation) et al., Respondents.
[1] Corporations-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation
-Security for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-While Corp. Code,
§ 834, requiring stockholder in derivative action to furnish
security for defendants' expenses if trial court finds that
there is no reasonable probability that corporation will benefit
from action, does not contain a comparable provision requiring
corporation to post security for stockholder's expenses if trial
court finds a probability that corporation will benefit, this is
not a denial of equal protection, since stockholder will not
incur any liability for costs if he does not essay to bring in
equity a suit in corporation's right and, if he does bring suit,
he knows that he, like all others in his class, will be subject
to regulating provisions of statute.
(2] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Judgment-Costs and Counsel Fees.-Although the law does not
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Corporations, §§ 225, 226; Am.Jur., Corporations, § 471.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 5, 6, 9-14, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23] Corporations, § 368.5; [2] Corporations, § 368; [4, 8] Corporations,
§ 353; [7] Constitutional Law, § 150; [15] Bonds, § 2; [18, 19]
Corporations, § 363; [21] Motions, § 24(6),

